David Hitchcock, in his recent “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument”, defends a recursive definition of ‘argument.’ I present and discuss several problems that arise for his definition. I argue that refining Hitchcock’s definition in order to resolve these problems reveals a crucial, but minimally explicated, relation that was, at best, playing an obscured role in the original definition or, at worst, completely absent from the original definition.

Differing worldviews give interdisciplinary work value. However, these same differences are the primary hurdle to productive communication between disciplines. Here, we argue that philosophical issues of metaphysics and epistemology subserve many of the differences in language, methods and motivation that plague interdisciplinary fields like educational neuroscience. Researchers attempting interdisciplinary work may be unaware that issues of philosophy are intimately tied to the way research is performed and evaluated in different fields. As such, a lack of explicit discussion about these assumptions (...) leads to many conflicts in interdisciplinary work that masquerade as more superficial issues. To illustrate, we investigate how philosophical assumptions about the mind may influence researchers in educational neuroscience. The methods employed by researchers in this field are shaped by their metaphysical beliefs, and arguments around these issues can threaten accepted disciplinary ontologies. Additionally, how a researcher understands reduction in the special sciences and how they place their colleagues in this ontology constrains the scope of interdisciplinary projects. In encouraging researchers to explicitly discuss the philosophical assumptions underlying their research we hope to alleviate some of the conflict and establish realistic expectations for collaborative projects. (shrink)

Contextualists with regard to knowledge argue that the truth of the claim 'x knows that P' is contextually dependent. In doing so, they attempt to articulate the nature of the contextual dependence. Since part of making knowledge claims involves the adequate justification of beliefs, I shall explore whether any epistemic contextualist theories can be modified or adapted to provide an account of the context-dependence of justificatory strength for arguments. I shall conclude that the prospects are not promising.

Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for (...) the possibility of zero premise arguments. (shrink)

The two volumes together may be described as search for the original ideational foundations of Indian Culture. In one way this work recalls the tradition of Coomaraswamy but seeks to join it to the mainstream of critical history. It argues that the living continuity of Indian Culture is rooted in a unique spiritual vision and social experience. Indian Culture is neither the result of merely accidental happenings through the centuries, nor a mere palimpsest of migrations and invasions. It is, in (...) its essence, a development of foundational ideas constituting a creative matrix. Behind its changing historical forms lies a deep and persistent source of creativity which is spiritual in character. The Present volume I deals with the spiritual vision and symbolic forms. Here is has been upheld that the spiritual vision of India had two original aspects, the integral or synoptic vision of the Vedas, and the Sramanic vision of Transcendence. Purnata and Sunyata constituted the two poles round which Indian spirituality revolved. The author not only elucidates this bipolar matrix of Indian spirituality revolved. The author not only elucidates this bipolar matrix of Indian spiritual praxis or sadhana, but also traces its intricate ancient history. He goes on to trace the great symbolic forms-language, myth, science, literature and art-in which this basic vision expressed itself. In all these areas he brings out the basic general principles expressive of inner consciousness rather than present a mere selection of well-known details. (shrink)

SummaryMy view is that the relevant alternative position should be conceived of as in two parts:With respect to many propositions, to establish a knowledge claim is to be able to support it as opposed to a limited number of alternatives — i.e., only those which are relevant in the context.With respect to many propositions — in particular those which are such that their negations are not relevant alternatives in the context in question — we simply know them to be true (...) and do not need evidence, in the normal sense, that they, rather than their negations, are true. So conceived, the relevant alternative view neither supports the abandonment of deductive closure, nor is such abandonment in any way needed to provide the relevant alternative view with an answer to the skeptic, insofar as he can be answered. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

As the world moves into the 21st century, business managers face new and daunting challenges to their legitimacy. Those who run the world’s 72,0000 multinational firms and their 828,000 subsidiaries face special difficulties.These firms constitute a global economy that has produced much that is useful, including wondrous technologies and great wealth for many. Nevertheless, one in five of the world’s six billion people lives in extreme poverty, surviving on less than $1 a day. Half the world lives on less than (...) $2. In spite of roughly $1 trillion that has been spent to fight poverty around the globe in the last 50 years and vastly increased trade and investment, most people in Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia are poorer today than they were ten years ago, and most Africans were better off 40 years ago.2 Environmental degradation increases, as do disease and violations of human rights.Unreasonable as it may be to blame business for the world’s ills, the blame sticks, because the ills – like multinationals – transcend national boundaries and are in many ways beyond the power of existing governments to affect. And global government has yet to evolve. Furthermore, the governments of many countries lack either the will or the ability to reduce poverty within their jurisdictions, meaning that if MNCs do not do it, it won’t be done.In addition to the undesirable costs of the globalisation they have helped to create, managers are concerned also with the greed, crime and scandal in their own ranks. So it is appropriate to help them inspect the assumptions that have been used to justify their power and authority, and to consider whether those assumptions need renovation. This I shall do in Part I of this essay. In Part II I shall seek a historical perspective, because in many ways the criticism of business and globalisation today echoes the debate in the 1930s about which economic system was best, communism, socialism or capitalism. Capitalism, we suppose, has won, but if so, what is it? Is it the same everywhere – in China, Japan, Europe, Mexico, the United States, and elsewhere? If not, is the very word not misleading? (shrink)

First Published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.